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The mounting number of convictions reversed as a result of DNA
testing and television shows like "CSI" have probably given the
general public some misperceptions about forensic evidence and the
criminal justice system. First, DNA is not always a magic bullet
that will conclusively demonstrate innocence. Second, not all
forensic evidence presented at trial is scientifically valid. To the
contrary, junk science has been a major cause of wrongful
convictions. Finally, prosecutors do not willingly and graciously
partner with innocence projects when we come forward with
information suggesting that an innocent person has been convicted
of a crime. Instead, most prosecutors reflexively fight efforts to
overturn wrongful convictions even when faced with evidence of
innocence that most fair-minded people would find compelling.'
Those facts are also illustrated by the story of William Richards's
efforts to overturn his wrongful conviction. In 2001, William
Richards contacted the newly formed California Innocence Project
(CIP) for help. In 1997, Richards had been convicted of killing his
wife, Pamela Richards. As will be discussed, the evidence against
him was, primarily, circumstantial and far from compelling. What
follows is the story of our 2 continuing efforts to seek his release.
* Professor of Law and Co-Director, California Innocence Project, California Western
School of Law.
1 The struggle to overturn wrongful convictions and the attitude of prosecutors in opposing
those efforts is illustrated in two powerful documentaries: After Innocence [which documents
several cases pursued by the Innocence Project] and Witch Hunt [which documents the efforts
that the California Innocence Project and the Northern California Innocence Project
undertook to exonerate John Stoll and others who were wrongfully convicted for being part of
an alleged child molestation ring in Bakersfield, California]. AFTER INNOCENCE (New Yorker
Films 2005); WITCH HuNT (KTF Films 2008).
2 Most of the work in the Richards investigation and litigation was directed by me and my
"partner in crime" Justin Brooks, Co-Founder and Director of the California Innocence
Project. But cases like this "take a village." Over the nine year life of this case, Justin and I
were assisted by four staff attorneys (Nancy Rosenfeld, Alex Simpson, Wendy Koen, and
1357
Albany Law Review
II, THE CRIME SCENE AND FIRST Two TRIALS
Sometime in the afternoon or evening of August 10, 1993, Pamela
Richards was strangled and severely beaten with a large paving
stone and a cinder block. 3 The murder scene was a remote location
in Hesperia, California. Bill and Pamela lived there in a trailer.
Electricity came from a gas powered generator.
Richards left work on the night of August 10, 1993, at 11:03 p.m.
Based on "trial runs" from his workplace, the San Bernardino
County Sheriffs Department believed that Bill arrived home at
11:47. Richards called 911 at 11:58. Thus, under the prosecution's
time line, Richards had approximately eleven minutes in which to
have committed the crime. And it was undisputed that during that
small window of time, Richards received a phone call from a man
named Gene Price, who called and expressed concern because he
had been unable to reach Pamela by phone earlier that evening.
It took a while for the police to arrive and even then, they did not
secure or process the crime scene. It was too dark. The
investigation did not really commence until daylight and by then,
dogs which roamed the area had wandered around the crime scene
and had partially covered up Pamela's face with dirt. In addition,
no one from the Sheriffs Department or the Medical Examiner's
Office ever attempted to take Pamela's core liver temperature to
determine a time of death. Nor did they investigate other clues that
might have established a clearer time line. For example, they did
not feel the generator to see if it had been used that night.
The first two trials resulted in hung juries. The prosecution
introduced some evidence to suggest that Bill and Pamela were
having marital and financial problems. The prosecution introduced
some testimony which suggested that Richards had lied about
whether he had found Pamela's body face up or face down (a fact
which had no forensic significance). The prosecution introduced
blood spatter evidence which suggested that blood stains found on
Richards's clothing were consistent with high velocity blood spatter
and not merely blood which had been transferred when, as Richards
claimed, he'd cradled Pamela's dead body. Finally, the prosecution
Alissa Bjerkhoel), two volunteer attorneys (Mario Conte and Christopher Plourd) and eight
clinic students (Amy Luo, Jevon Hatcher, John Nielsen, Lance Banks, Ashley Augustin, Brian
McNeil, Mary Ott, and Derek Van Deviver). All deserve credit for our success to date.
3 The description of the events is taken from the record on appeal. Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus at 30, People v. Richards, No. E024365 (Cal. Ct. App., 4th App. Dist., Div. 2
Dec. 5, 2007).
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argued that a small tuft of blue fibers allegedly found under
Pamela's fingernail was consistent with material from the shirt that
Richards had worn.
The defense countered with an expert who testified that the
limited amount of blood found on Richards's clothing was totally
inconsistent with the prosecution's theory. The crime scene
indicated a violent bloody struggle had taken place and Richards
had almost no blood on his shirt and no blood spatter on his pants.
The defense also relied on the fact that Richards had no marks on
any part of his body, yet Pamela's broken fingernails suggested that
her attacker would have some scratches or other marks from the
struggle. Finally, the defense pointed to the absence of any marks
or tears on Richards's shirt. Other than a hole made by the Sheriffs
Department's criminalist (Daniel Gregonis) to obtain a sample for
fiber comparison, the shirt was intact.
III. THE BITE MARK EVIDENCE IN THE THIRD TRIAL
During the third trial, both sides introduced testimony from
forensic odontologists regarding a crescent shaped injury (or
"lesion") which had been found on Pamela's right hand. Relying on
a single photograph provided by the prosecution, Dr. Norman
Sperber, the prosecution's expert, testified that the injury was
consistent with a human bite mark. He also testified that whoever
had left that bite mark had a rather distinctive abnormality relative
to their lower right canine tooth which would only occur in "one or
two or less" out of one hundred people. The defense expert, Dr.
Gregory Golden, also based his testimony on the one photograph.
Like Sperber, Golden believed that injury was a human bite mark
and testified that he could not rule Richards out as the biter.
However, he testified that he could also not rule out others, whose
(teeth) exemplars he had in his office.
This time, after deliberating for three days, the jury came back
with a guilty verdict.
IV. DNA TESTING
As indicated, in 2001, Richards contacted the California
Innocence Project. We quickly determined that there was a hair
found under Pamela's fingernail which had never been tested. We
also believed that the rough surfaces of the paving stone and the
cinder block might contain testable genetic material left by the
person who wielded these weapons. Finally, we identified
2010] 1359
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individuals who might be linked to the crime through DNA testing
of the hair and the paving stone.
One, Gene Price, was the person who claimed to have tried to call
Pamela on the night of the murder. Our investigation indicated
that he and Pamela once had an intimate relationship. However,
Pamela's sister (now deceased) told us that the Pamela's
relationship with Price had ended and that Pamela was now afraid
of Price.
The second was an individual named Rafael Resendez-Ramirez
("Resendez"). At the time, Resendez was on death row in Texas.
Known as the "Railway Killer," Resendez was believed to have been
responsible for scores of murders throughout the United States and
Mexico. 4 Of particular interest to us was the fact that Resendez
traveled by train and committed most of his crimes in remote areas
near railroad lines. (Richards's property was both remote and near
to a railway line.) In addition, Resendez's crimes were particularly
bloody and brutal. 5
Then-recent legislation in California allowed us to get court-
ordered DNA testing in cases where the identity of the perpetrator
was at issue, where the evidence sought to be tested would be
material to issue of identity, and where test results would have
raised a probability of a more favorable result if the testing had
been available at the time of trial. 6
In order to expedite the testing, and because we believed that
Richards's case was exactly the kind of case the legislature had in
mind when it enacted Penal Code section 1405, Justin and I picked
up the phone and called Michael Risley, the Deputy District
Attorney (DDA) who had prosecuted the case. Risley did not share
our view. First, he told us that our client was guilty. When we
asked Risley why he could be so sure in light of the absence of any
direct evidence and the fact that two prior juries had doubt
regarding Richards's culpability, Risley said, in words or substance:
"Trust me. I know he's guilty." Risley then made it clear that while
he was happy to "cooperate" with us, his office would not stipulate
to testing and would vigorously oppose a 1405 motion.
So in December of 2005, we filed our 1405 motion, and in
February of 2006, the District Attorney's office filed its opposition.
4 Linda Diebel, 187 Deaths Now Linked to Railway Killer, TORONTO STAR, July 6, 1999.
5 Michael Graczky, Suspected Serial Killer Resendez-Ramirez is a Master of Disguise,
MACON TELEGRAPH, June 24, 1999, at B6; Allan Turner, Texas Killer May Have Links to '93
California Cases, Hous. CHRON., Nov. 18, 2001, at A37.
6 CAL. PENAL CODE 1405(f) (West Supp. 2010).
1360 [Vol. 73.4
View from the Trenches
On the issue of whether favorable DNA evidence would have made a
difference in the result, we, of course, cited the fact that two prior
juries had been unable to reach a guilty verdict. 7 The District
Attorney's response to that claim (authored by DDA Grover Merritt)
ranks as one of the oddest I've encountered in over thirty-four years
of practice. For example, he cited the movie 12 Angry Men for the
proposition that juror disagreement does not necessarily mean
disagreement over the evidence.8 Justin and I were both amused
and confused: Was Merritt trying to argue that the jurors in 12
Angry Men were wrong and that the movie should have ended in a
guilty verdict? Or was he saying that the criminal justice system
should not trust jury verdicts-an odd position for a prosecutor to
maintain?
Regardless, in July of 2003, the judge who heard the motion
granted it and we were, naively, confident that Richards's release
was just going to be a matter of time, maybe six months to a year.
However, our DNA consultant had suggested to us that we have all
testing done by the California Department of Justice (DOJ) in order
to avoid any claims that the lab which tested the material was
untrustworthy or biased. The District Attorney's office agreed to
that suggestion and the critical items (including the paving stone
and the hair found under Pamela's fingernail) were sent off for
testing in mid-2003.
Unfortunately, the DOJ did not give our request much priority
and, literally, years went by without any testing being performed. 9
Despite repeated calls and letters, we did not get all of the DNA test
results back until February, 2007.
As we hoped and expected, DNA was found on the paving stone in
the exact location where the Criminalist Gregonis had suggested
the killer's DNA might be found and that DNA did not match either
Bill or Pamela. Similarly, mitochondrial DNA testing indicated
that the hair found under Pamela's nail did not belong to either Bill
or Pamela. Unfortunately, it was impossible to determine whether
the DNA from the paving stone came from the person whose hair
7 Motion for DNA Testing at 17, People v. Richards, No. FVI-00826 (Super. Ct. San
Bernardino County Dec. 5, 2002).
8 Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Post-Conviction DNA Testing at 20, People v.
Richards, No. FVI-00826 (Super. Ct. San Bernardino County Dec. 5, 2002).
9 Similar problems have arisen on other cases. In one case, the court ordered DNA testing
on hair found in the victim's hand. The lab insisted that "hair" was singular and would not
test all of the hair we had sent. The lab wanted us to select one. We declined and went back
to court for clarification.
13612010]
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was found under Pamela's fingernail. 10
IV. NEW BITE MARK EVIDENCE
While we were waiting for the DNA results, we contacted two
other forensic odontologists and interviewed the two dental experts
who had testified at Richards's third trial. The results were eye-
opening. First, we learned that the photograph which Dr. Sperber
and Dr. Golden had relied upon contained what is known as
"angular distortion" caused by the fact that the camera which had
taken the photo had not been on the same plane as the surface of
the hand. Using Adobe Photoshop, Dr. Michael Bowers was able to
correct the angular distortion. When he did so and compared the
corrected photograph with an exemplar of Richards's teeth, he was
able to exclude Richards's teeth as the source of injury found on
Pamela's hand.
Another expert suggested that the injury which the prosecution
claimed was a bite mark, could as easily have been made by a wire
mesh screen found near the body.
Finally, Dr. Sperber recanted his trial testimony. Dr. Sperber
told us that he never should have provided an estimate regarding
the percentage of the population which had the dentition
abnormality he had identified in Richards. At the time, he was not
aware of any studies which would have provided statistical support
for his testimony. Moreover, the American Board of Forensic
Odontology now finds such testimony to be inappropriate in the
absence of any scientific studies. Finally, he, like Dr. Bowers, now
believed that the corrected photo ruled out Richards as the person
who caused the injury.
V. WERE THE BLUE FIBERS PLANTED?
My partner Justin always tells our students that they need to
"rework the crime." To the extent possible, they should reexamine
all of the evidence to see where it was found, how it was handled,
and how it was used as trial. Following this admonition, a clinic
student named Wendy Koen went back through the autopsy photos
(taken prior to Pamela's fingers being removed) and compared them
10 Mitochondrial DNA is found outside of the nucleus of a cell. Examination produces a
.sequence." Nuclear DNA comes from the nucleus and, when tested, reveals a "profile." See
Stipulated Testimony of Marc Taylor, Transcript on Appeal at 995, In re Richards, No.
E049135 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2007).
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with the photos allegedly showing the tuft of blue fiber being
removed from under the fingernail (which occurred after the fingers
had been removed and given to Criminalist Gregonis). That
examination suggested that the fibers were not present in the nail
at the time of the autopsy and therefore could not have been there
as a result of any struggle between Pamela and her killer. In
addition, Wendy's research indicated that Gregonis had been
accused of providing false and misleading evidence in another high
profile murder case in San Bernardino County.
VI. THE HABEAS PROCEEDINGS
In November of 2007, we filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus
seeking to overturn Richards's conviction.11 By then, we were under
no illusions regarding the fact that we were going to face vigorous
opposition to our claim. Fortunately, we had a judge who was both
fair and intelligent. Unfortunately, this did not result in a quick
resolution.
Some delay was caused by the District Attorney's written
response to the petition. The initial response was a long, rambling
explanation of why Richards was guilty but never directly admitted
or denied the specific allegations in the petition. I was forced to
make a motion to strike the District Attorney's pleading for its
failure to either admit or deny the particular allegations we had
made. The District Attorney's second response was equally flawed
and I had to make another trip to San Bernardino to argue-
successfully-that the court should strike the second response.
Further delay was caused by the fact that habeas work is low
priority for the courts and District Attorney's office. In addition,
since we did not have subpoena power or discovery rights prior to
the filing of a petition, we had to start and stop proceedings as new
information came to light. For example, we first learned, more than
a year after the petition had been filed, that the District Attorney's
office at one point had three photographs of the injury on Pamela's
hand and that back in 1994, there had been a request to have those
photographs sent to an expert for an opinion.
This resulted in some substantial and unexpected delay. It was
possible that the prosecution had failed to turn over photos and a
report suggested we might have to raise a Brady claim against DDA
11 The testimony described in this section is taken from the record on appeal. Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus at 10, in re Richards, No. E049135 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2007).
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Risley. 12 That possibility prompted DDA Meritt to recuse himself.
Between the time of our 1405 motion and the hearing, Risley had
been responsible for Meritt getting fired. Meritt sued and was
reinstated, but did not believe that he could stand up in court and
vouch for Risley's honesty and integrity. Unless we were willing to
drop any possible Brady claim, the case was going to be put on hold
until a new DDA could substitute for Meritt and get up to speed.
What made the decision to pursue a possible Brady claim even
harder was the fact that Bill Richards had developed cancer and
time was not on his side.
Unfortunately, the other pictures were never found and to this
day we do not know whether they were submitted to an expert.
When we questioned a detective who had been involved about that
inquiry, he told us that the medical examiner had concluded that
the bite mark on Pamela's arm had come from a dog.
VII. THE LEGAL ARGUMENTS
Our legal theory was that Richards's conviction was the product
of false evidence (the bite mark testimony and the fiber testimony)
and that we had new exculpatory evidence (the new expert
testimony based on the corrected photograph of the alleged bite
mark and results of the DNA testing). In California, the standards
for the two are similar. A criminal judgment may be collaterally
attacked on the basis of newly discovered evidence if such evidence
casts a "fundamental doubt on the accuracy and reliability of the
proceedings" and "undermine[s] the entire prosecution case and
point[s] unerringly to innocence or reduced culpability." 13 However,
it is not necessary that a petitioner refute every piece of evidence or
every possible scenario in order to conclusively establish his
innocence. 14 To obtain habeas relief on the ground of false evidence,
there is no requirement that perjury be proved. 15 Where a false
evidence claim is based upon non-perjured false testimony, the
California Supreme Court has suggested, recently, that the same
standard which applies to new evidence applies to the false evidence
claim. 16
12 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
13 In re Hardy, 163 P.3d 853, 882 (Cal. 2007); In re Hall, 637 P.2d 690, 693 (Cal. 1981); In
re Weber, 523 P.2d 229, 243 (Cal. 1974).
14 See Hall, 637 P.2d at 698.
15 In re Wright, 144 Cal. Rptr. 535, 549 n.5 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
16 In re Lawley, 179 P.3d 891, 898 (Cal. 2008). In Lawley, the California Supreme Court
made it quite clear that the "actual innocence" standard did apply to new evidence claims.
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VIII. RICHARDS'S CONVICTION WAS BASED ON "JUNK" SCIENCE
Between the time of Richards's conviction and the habeas hearing
there was a wealth of research and case law which supported our
claim that Dr. Sperber's trial testimony regarding Richards's teeth
being a match and one that would only be found in some low,
defined percentage of the population was the equivalent of "junk
science."
Even before Richards's conviction, the scientific validity of bite
mark comparisons and testimony has been challenged. For
example, in 1985, two researchers wrote:
There is effectively no valid documented scientific data to
support the hypothesis that bite marks are demonstrably
unique. Additionally, there is no documented scientific data
to support the hypothesis that a latent bite mark, like a
latent fingerprint, is a true and accurate reflection of this
uniqueness. To the contrary, what little scientific evidence
that does exist clearly supports the conclusion that crime-
related bite marks are grossly distorted, inaccurate, and
therefore unreliable as a method of identification. 17
Those criticisms had not dissipated in the ensuing twenty-four
years, and were echoed in a recently published study of the National
Research Council entitled Strengthening Forensic Science in the
United States: A Path Forward. 18
The NSC Study was the product of a congressional request that
the National Academy of Sciences review issues related to the use of
non-DNA forensic evidence in our judicial system. 19  In its
introduction, the NSC Study states:
For decades, the forensic science disciplines have produced
valuable evidence that has contributed to the successful
prosecution and conviction of criminals as well as the
exoneration of innocent people....
Those advances, however, also have revealed that, in some
cases, substantive information and testimony based on faulty
However, the Supreme Court did not expressly state that this standard was going to apply to
false evidence claims under Penal Code § 1473. Moreover, the court repeatedly cited its
decision in In re Bell, 170 P.3d 153, 157 (Cal. 2007), which articulates different standards for
new evidence and false evidence claims.
17 Allen P. Wilkinson & Ronald M. Gerughty, Bite Mark Evidence: Its Admissibility Is
Hard to Swallow, 12 W. ST. U. L. REV. 519, 560 (1985).
18 NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADEMIES, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC
SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009).
19 Id. at 1-2.
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forensic science analyses may have contributed to wrongful
convictions of innocent people. This fact has demonstrated
the potential danger of giving undue weight to evidence and
testimony derived from imperfect testing and analysis.
Moreover, imprecise or exaggerated expert testimony has
sometimes contributed to the admission of erroneous or
misleading evidence. 20
In its discussion of the admissibility of forensic evidence, the NSC
Study found that "[m]uch forensic evidence-including, for example,
bite marks and firearm and toolmark identifications-is introduced
in criminal trials without any meaningful scientific validation,
determination of error rates, or reliability testing to explain the
limits of the discipline."21
In the specific section on forensic odontology, the NSC Study
found that bite mark comparison was the most controversial area of
forensic odontology and that there "is continuing dispute over the
value and scientific validity of comparing and identifying bite
marks."22 In its criticism of bite mark comparisons, the NSC Study
stated:
There is no science on the reproducibility of the different
methods of analysis that lead to conclusions about the
probability of a match.... Even when using the [American
Board of Forensic Odontology] guidelines, different experts
provide widely differing results and a high percentage of
false positive matches of bite marks using controlled
comparison studies.
No thorough study has been conducted of large
populations to establish the uniqueness of bite marks .... If
a bite mark is compared to a dental cast ... there is no
established science indicating what percentage of the
population or subgroup of the population could also have
produced the bite.23
Similar conclusions were reached in a recent study of wrongful
convictions by Brandon L. Garrett and Peter J. Neufeld, entitled
Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and Wrongful Convictions,
documenting four cases in which odontologists provided invalid
testimony which led to convictions. 24 One case, involving Ray
20 Id. at 4.
21 Id. at 107-108 (footnotes omitted).
22 Id. at 173 (footnote omitted).
23 Id. at 174 (footnote omitted).
24 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 69 (2009).
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Krone, 25 was similar to Richards's. The case was mostly
circumstantial and the bite mark evidence was described as
"critical" to the state's case.26 As in Richards's case, the forensic
odontologist found a match and advanced statistics (one in 1200) to
suggest the significance of the match. 27 Krone was ultimately
exonerated when DNA evidence found on the victim excluded him.
28
Although there are documented problems with bite mark
"matches," bite mark exclusions can be reliable. For example, the
Summary Assessment of bite mark analysis in the NSC Study
states: "Despite the inherent weaknesses involved in bite mark
comparison, it is reasonable to assume that the process can
sometimes reliably exclude suspects." 29 Similarly, in the chapter on
Bite Mark and Dental Identification in Scientific Evidence, by Paul
C. Giannelli and Edward L. Imwinkelried, Jr., the authors write,
"[iut is easier to conclude that a person's dentition and a bite mark
do not match than it is to find a match. This is due to the fact that
any unexplained inconsistency between the bite mark and the
dentition means that the suspect could not have made the bite
mark."30
As indicated, bite mark evidence was provided at Richards's trial
by Dr. Norman Sperber, the chief forensic odontologist for San
Diego and Imperial Counties. Relying on only a single, distorted
photograph, Dr. Sperber identified a mark that he said: was
consistent with a human bite mark; whoever left the mark had a
rather distinctive abnormality relative to their lower right canine
tooth (number 27); that Richards had the same distinctive
abnormality; and that "'one or two or less' out of one hundred people
would have such an abnormality."31  The defense expert, Dr.
Golden, also testified from that same single photograph, that he
"assumed" the lesion was a bite mark and that he could not rule out
Richards as the biter.32
At the hearing, all of that testimony was recanted. Using new
25 Ray Krone was represented by San Diego Attorney Christopher Plourd, who provided
great assistance to us in the Richards case.
26 State v. Krone, 897 P.2d 621, 624 (Ariz. 1995).
27 Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 24, at 69-70.
28 Dennis Wagner et. al, DNA Frees Arizona Inmate After 10 Years in Prison, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC, Apr. 9, 2002, at Al, available at www.truthinjustice.org/krone.htm.
29 NSC Study, supra note 18, at 176.
30 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD L. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: BITE MARK AND
DENTAL IDENTIFICATION § 13.04, at 677 (4th ed. 2007) (emphasis in original).
31 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 3, at 35.
32 Id. at 36.
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scientific techniques, we were also able to demonstrate that the bite
mark testimony provided at trial by Dr. Sperber was "false
evidence." First, Dr. Sperber testified that the picture of the "bite
mark" was "unreliable and inaccurate" because of the relationship
between the camera and the ruler that was next to the lesion. 33 Dr.
Sperber also testified that the lesion could have been produced by
someone without Richards' dentition abnormality. 34 A barrier, like
some clothing could have been over part of the area of the lesion
which would have "nullif[ied]" the ability to see a mark from the
lower right canine. 35 Dr. Sperber also acknowledged that he never
attempted to use the mold of Richards's teeth to see if it would
make a "bite registration" or "dental impression." Instead, his trial
testimony was just based solely on his visual observation: "Because
I had basically eyeballed this case and I saw one tooth that was
shorter than the others. I saw a space in that collection of red
lesion ".... 36
In addition, Dr. Sperber testified that he never should have
provided an estimate regarding the percentage of the population
which had the dentition abnormality he had identified in
Richards. 37 At the time, he was not aware of any studies which
would have provided statistical support for his testimony. 38 He also
testified that the American Board of Forensic Odontology now finds
such testimony to be inappropriate in the absence of any scientific
studies. 39
Finally, contrary to his trial testimony that the lesion was
consistent with Richards's dentition, at the hearing, Dr. Sperber
testified that he had "no degree of certainty" that Richards's teeth
could have caused the lesion.40 Sperber also "ruled... out"
Richards as the person who caused the lesion: "My opinion today is
that [Richards's] teeth, as we have seen, are not consistent with the
lesion on the hand."41 "Nonconsistent means you don't see similar
patterns. I have essentially ruled [Richards] out."42
3 Reporter's Transcript of Oral Proceedings on Appeal at 67, People v. Richards, No.
E024365 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th Dist. Dec. 10, 2009) [hereinafter Reporter's Transcript] (on file
with Albany Law Review).
3 Id. at 72.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 89-90; see also id. at 55.
37 Id. at 74.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 81.
41 Id. at 91.
42 Id.
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Dr. Golden testified that since Richards's trial, he and other
forensic odontologists have used Adobe Photoshop to correct the
distortion that is visible in photographs. 43 Dr. Golden testified that
with advances in technology he has been able to do a more accurate
analysis and, based on that analysis, Richards's "dental signature"
did not line up as well with the injury as it did in the distorted
image he had examined. 44 Unlike at trial, where he testified that
he could not rule out Richards as the source of the lesion, at the
hearing, based on the digital analysis, Dr. Golden ruled Richards
out.45 In fact, Dr. Golden also testified that the lesion might well
have been caused by a dog bite as it fits "the classic characteristics"
he has seen in dog bites. 46
Dr. Ray Johansen, an author of a book on the use of digital
analysis of bite mark evidence using Adobe Photoshop, 47 testified
that there was some distortion in the photograph that had been
taken of Pamela's hand. 48 Using Adobe Photoshop, Dr. Johansen
created a version of the photograph which corrected the distortion
contained in the original photograph. 49 He also created a corrected
photo with an outline of Richards's upper teeth.50 Dr. Johansen
used the upper arched because it was "more consistent with the size
and shape to the injury pattern. ' 51 According to Dr. Johansen,
there were marks on Pamela's hand which were outside the semi-
circular dentition area of Richards's teeth. 52
Dr. Johansen also analyzed pictures of other bruises on Pamela
and compared them with metal fencing type material found near
the body at the crime scene. Based on this analysis, Dr. Johansen
concluded that there were common features between the fence
pattern and Richards's dentition.53  Ultimately, Dr. Johansen
reached and testified to three conclusions: (1) that the original
image was distorted, (2) that the hand injury was as likely caused
43 Id. at 97-98.
44 Id. at 100.
41 Id. at 110.
46 Id. at 100.
47 Id. at 116.
48 Id. at 129-130; Clerk's Transcript on Appeal at 1225-32 exhibits 16a-d, People v.
Richards, No. E024305 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th Dist. Dec. 10, 2009) (on file with Albany Law
Review).
49 Reporter's Transcript, supra note 33, at 139; Clerk's Transcript on Appeal, supra note
48, at 1237-38 Ex. 16g.
50 Reporter's Transcript, supra note 33, at 140-42; Clerk's Transcript on Appeal, supra
note 49, at 1239-40 Ex. 16h.
51 Reporter's Transcript, supra note 33, at 178.
52 Id. at 143.
53 Id. at 152.
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by the fence as by Richards, and (3) that whatever mechanism
caused the hand injury could also have caused another injury found
on Pamela's arm. 54
Dr. Bowers, like the other experts, testified that the photograph
of Pamela's hand which was used at Richards's trial was distorted. 55
Like the other experts, Dr. Bowers created a corrected version of the
photograph using Adobe Photoshop. 56
Dr. Bowers testified that he performed various measurements of
the bruise and of Richards's dentition. 57 For example, he measured
the bruise as twenty-four millimeters, yet Richards's lower teeth
were thirty-three millimeters. 58 Thus, according to Bowers, the
bruise was too small to have been made by Richards. 59
Dr. Bowers also testified to making a Styrofoam impression from
the plaster mold of Richards's teeth. 60 At trial, Dr. Sperber had
testified that tooth twenty-seven would not have made an
impression. 61  However, when Dr. Bowers used the mold of
Richards's teeth to make an impression in the Styrofoam, tooth
twenty-seven did leave a mark. 62 Using one of the Styrofoam
impressions and Adobe Photoshop, Dr. Bowers created a picture of
the bruise with an overlay of Richards's teeth. 63 Although there
were some areas where there was a positive correlation between
Richards's teeth and the bruise (Ex. 35), there were areas where
there was a mismatch. 64 Dr. Bowers testified that the areas of
correlation were based on a "forced match" (made as a starting point
using tooth number twenty-two). 65 The mismatches indicate that
Richards' teeth were not responsible for the bruise.66
Dr. Bowers also reviewed other bruises found on Pamela's body.
Like Dr. Johansen, he concluded that these other injuries cast doubt
on whether the bruise on Pamela's hand was even a bite mark. 67
Based on the cited case law and the testimony, we argued that
54 Id. at 156-57; Clerk's Transcript on Appeal, supra note 48, at 1266 exhibit 16U.
55 Reporter's Transcript, supra note 33, 213.
56 Id. at 215; Clerk's Transcript on Appeal, supra note 48, at 819 Ex. 3 fig. 4.
57 Reporter's Transcript, supra note 33, at 218.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 223; Clerk's Transcript on Appeal, supra note 48, at 822 Ex. 3 fig.4.
61 Reporter's Transcript, supra note 33, at 225.
62 Id. at 223-24; Clerk's Transcript on Appeal, supra note 48, at 828 Ex. 3 figs. 18, 19.
63 Reporter's Transcript, supra note 33, at 231; Clerk's Transcript on Appeal, supra note
48, at 826-27 Ex. 3 figs. 15, 16.
64 Reporter's Transcript, supra note 33, at 235.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 235-36.
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the critical question was whether the case presented against
Richards would have been undermined had the jury not heard the
baseless testimony indicating that Richards's dentition was a match
and that his tooth abnormality was shared by only 2% of the
population and if the jury had heard testimony indicating that the
bruise might not have been a bite mark and that even if it was a
bite mark, Richards could be excluded as the biter. We believed
(and argued) that the answer to both questions was an unequivocal
"yes."
We argued also that the prosecution's case was a "house of cards."
This was not a multiple eyewitness case, where undermining the
testimony of one eyewitness would be insufficient to undermine the
prosecution's case if their other eyewitnesses still identified that
defendant as the perpetrator of the crime. In such a case, each
eyewitness independently provides evidence sufficient to support a
conviction.
Instead, the case against Richards was circumstantial and
depended on the combination of four circumstantial foundational
pillars: the bite mark, the claim that there was no evidence of
another person present, the blue fiber, and the contested blood
spatter evidence. If any of these evidentiary pillars was
undermined, the case, like a building or a house of cards, collapses.
We also argued that the jury was swayed by the bogus statistics
provided by Dr. Sperber and argued by DDA Risley in closing
argument. Risley had argued specifically that it was unreasonable
for the jury to believe that the killer "just happened to share the
same dental abnormality as William Richards, who [sic] is only
shared by two percent of the population." 68  Courts have long
recognized the pernicious effect of false statistics on the fact finding
process. In People v. Collins,69 the California Supreme Court
reversed a conviction which had been based, in large part, on
statistical evidence which had no scientific basis. In Collins, the
prosecution attempted to bolster eyewitness identifications with
statistical testimony about the likelihood of another pair of
individuals with physical characteristics similar to the defendants
found at the scene. The California Supreme Court reversed the
conviction, in part, because there was an inadequate evidentiary
foundation for the probabilities used in the calculations: "First, as to
the foundational requirement, we find the record devoid of any
68 R.T. 1932.
69 People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33 (Cal. 1968).
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evidence relating to any of the six individual probability factors
used by the prosecutor .... The bare, inescapable fact is that the
prosecution made no attempt to offer any such evidence." 70  In
reaching this conclusion, the California Supreme Court quoted from
a New Mexico case for the proposition that "[Miathematical odds
are not admissible as evidence to identify a defendant in a criminal
proceeding so long as the odds are based on estimates, the validity
of which have not been demonstrated." 71 The California Supreme
Court ultimately ruled that this "'trial by mathematics' so distorted
the role of the jury and so disadvantaged counsel for the defense, as
to constitute in itself a miscarriage of justice." 72
The pernicious effect of unfounded statistics was also recognized
in Ege v. Yukins. 73 In Ege, a forensic expert testified that the
defendant's dentition matched a bite mark found on the victim and
that there was a 3.5 million to one chance that someone other than
the defendant had made the mark. 74 The District Court ultimately
concluded that the expert's testimony was "unreliable and grossly
misleading" and that the evidence was "so unfair that its admission
violate[d] fundamental concepts of justice" and the Court of Appeals
agreed. 75
Obviously, the statistics criticized in Collins and Ege were far
more dramatic than the evidence introduced against Richards.
However, because Richards was only convicted after a third trial
which included Dr. Sperber's unfounded scientific/mathematical
evidence, we argued that the false statistical evidence used against
Richards had the same impact that the false statistical evidence
had in Collins and Ege.
In Ege, the Court of Appeals also found that "[b]ite mark evidence
may by its very nature be overly prejudicial and unreliable." 76
Bite mark evidence is more persuasive on the ultimate issue of
guilt than other analogous forms of evidence. For example,
fingerprints tend to be circumstantial or associative; that is, they
rarely decide a case alone, but tend to link a defendant to the scene
of the crime or an object involved in the crime. By contrast, bite
marks, in the usual case, will be conclusive of the guilt issue: the
70 Id. at 38.
71 Id. at 39 (citing State v. Sneed, 414 P.2d 858, 862 (N.M. 1966)).
72 Collins, 438 P.2d at 41.
73 485 F.3d 364 (6th Cir. 2007).
74 Id. at 375.
75 Id. at 370.
76 Id. at 376.
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logical distance between the fact of biting and the ultimate issue of
guilt is short. Thus, admission of irrelevant bite mark evidence
may be particularly prejudicial to the defendant. 77
We further argued that even if the "false" evidence of a match
with an unfounded statistical correlation was not, by itself,
sufficient to undermine the conviction, the new evidence excluding
Richards as the biter undermined the prosecution's case. There is a
dramatic difference between an inclusion and an exclusion. As Dr.
Sperber testified: "In one situation you're saying Richards could
have done it. In another situation you're saying Richards couldn't
have done it."78 Moreover, as indicated, the significance and
probative power of exclusions (as opposed to matches) has been
supported by the same academic literature that has criticized the
use of statistics in alleged matches. 79
Since the bite mark evidence had been a pillar of the
prosecution's case, once that pillar was destroyed, so, too, was the
case against Richards.
IX. THE NEW DNA EVIDENCE UNDERMINED A SECOND PILLAR OF
THE PROSECUTION'S CASE
The DNA evidence presented a different challenge. The District
Attorney's office80 did not dispute that a hair, measuring two
centimeters (or just under an inch), from an unknown person, was
recovered from amongst blood and debris from under one of the
fingernails of Pamela's right hand. Nor did the District Attorney's
office dispute that mitochondrial DNA testing revealed this hair did
not match the DNA of either Pamela or Richards. Instead, the
District Attorney's office argued that the hair was probably
"historical," i.e., that it could have been picked up any time prior to
the crime and from a source other than Pamela's killer.
Our expert, Dr. Patricia Zajac, a consulting criminalist, testified
that she disagreed with the prosecution's belief that the hair was
likely historical. She opined that it was more likely that it was the
77 Id. at 377 n.6 (citing Adrienne Hale, Note, The Admissibility of Bite Mark Evidence, 51
S. CAL. L. REV. 309, 326 (1978)).
78 Reporter's Transcript, supra note 33, at 110.
79 See, e.g., NSC Study, supra note 18, at 5-37; see generally GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED,
supra note 30, §§ 13.01-13.09.
80 After Grover Merritt recused himself, another prosecutor (Steven Sinfield) took over the
case. Since both Merritt and Sinfield took the same position regarding the evidence,
reference will be to the position taken by the District Attorney's office.
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product of the attack.8' Dr. Zajac provided four reasons for her
conclusion. First, the length of the hair was such that a person like
Pamela (who was a waitress) would normally have noticed and
removed it.82 Second, the location of the crime scene was not a
place where one would normally find lots of hairs.8 3 Third, the hair
was found under, and not just on the nail, so it would take some
kind of action to get the hair in the place where it was found.8 4
Fourth, the nature of the crime, and the fact there had been a
violent struggle where the victim would defend herself, made it
more likely the hair was deposited during the struggle.85
With regard to the DNA found on the paving stone, the District
Attorney's office tried to back away from the position it had taken at
trial. At trial, the prosecution, through the testimony of Gregonis
and in argument, repeatedly took the position that a twelve-by-
twelve-by-two-inch paving stone found north of Pamela was one of
the weapons used to murder Pamela. In his opening statement
DDA Risley had said, "the attacker picked up a concrete stepping
stone and threw it at her face. The attacker then picked up a
second concrete stepping stone and threw it at her face."8 6
Similarly, at trial, Criminalist Gregonis repeatedly referred to the
stone as a weapon.87
However, when DNA testing by the Department of Justice
conclusive established that male DNA not belonging to Richards
was found where Gregonis had predicted that one would find
biological evidence from the killer, the District Attorney's office first
tried to argue that the paving stone might not have been a murder
weapon-a position that was at odds with the position taken at
trial. The District Attorney's office also argued that the genetic
material might have post-dated the murder, when the paving stone
was handled by other (e.g., the police, court personnel or even
jurors).
81 Reporter's Transcript, supra note 33, at 310.
82 Id. Even the prosecution's criminalist admitted that the hair's location under the nail
was relevant and that it was more likely that a woman working as a waitress would be more
fastidious in her grooming and cleanliness. H.T. II 47.
83 Reporter's Transcript, supra note 33, at 310.
84 Id. at 312.
85 Id. at 312-14.
8 R.T. 54.
87 R.T. 975, 999, 1000, 1079.
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X. THE PLANTED BLUE FIBERS?
The photographs which suggested that the blue fibers had not
been present under Pamela's nails until after her fingers had been
cut off during the autopsy was both the strongest and weakest parts
of our case. If we could have convinced the judge that this evidence
had been planted, it would have guaranteed a reversal. But
convincing a judge that a member of the prosecution team had been
guilty of planting evidence was a hard sell. As with forensic
odontology, there is an unfortunate documented history of wrongful
convictions obtained through fabricated and planted forensic
evidence. In fact, the wrongful convictions in 50% of the first
seventy-four DNA exonerations were attributable to government
misconduct, including deliberate fabrication of evidence.88
One example of deliberate fabrication of evidence can be found in
the case of State v. Duncan.89 In 1994, prosecutors charged Jimmie
Duncan with capital murder for the drowning death of a toddler.9°
Duncan was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death based partly
on bite-mark evidence that Duncan had bitten the toddler on her
right cheek. 91 Duncan's post-conviction attorneys discovered a video
in the district attorney's file which documented forensic odontologist
Michael West's examination of the toddler. 92 In the video, West was
caught repeatedly pressing and scraping a dental mold of Duncan's
teeth on the deceased toddler's right cheek, creating a bite mark
that was not formerly present. 93
Another example is the case Kevin Cooper, who was tried and
sentenced to death for murder. In a May 2009 dissenting opinion to
a denial of a petition for a rehearing en banc, five judges of the
Ninth Circuit concluded that the San Bernardino County Sheriffs
Department concealed or destroyed exculpatory evidence as well as
manipulated and planted evidence. 94 The testimony of Gregonis
was specifically called into question by the dissenting opinion and
provided the basis for the five judges concluding that there was a
88 The Innocence Project, Understand the Causes: Government Misconduct,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/Government-Misconduct.php (last visited Mar.
30, 2010).
89 802 So. 2d 533 (La. 2001).
90 Id. at 542.
91 Id. at 541-42.
92 Radley Balko, Manufacturing Guilt?: Experts Say this Exclusive Video Shows a Dental
Examiner Creating the Bite Marks that Put a Man on Death Row, REASON, Feb. 19, 2009,
available at http:lreason.com/archives/2009/O2l9/manufacturing-guilt.
93 Id.
9 Cooper v. Brown, 565 F.3d 581, 634 (9th Cir. 2009).
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''strong likelihood" that the blood test results were "false evidence"
and that the evidence was "tampered with ... to ensure that it
would generate inculpatory results." 95
Other examples of evidence fabrication include a pathologist
named Ralph R. Erdmann, who was accused of malfeasance in as
many as twenty capital cases, and who faked around one hundred
autopsies because he never performed autopsies on the bodies,
falsified toxicology reports, and falsified tissues samples. 96 One
investigation into evidence tampering by the New York State Police
Department revealed up to thirty-six cases over the span of eight
years in which six troopers fabricated evidence, usually by planting
fingerprints.97
In addition to planting and fabricating evidence, forensics experts
have blatantly lied about evidence linking a suspect to a crime. For
example, forensic expert Fred Zain testified as an expert in dozens
cases about tests he had never done and results he had never
obtained. 98 Zain's misconduct led to the wrongful conviction of Glen
Woodall in 1987, when Zain falsely testified that semen recovered
from the victims were identical to Woodall's. 99 In 1993, at the
request of Prosecuting Attorney William Forbes, a circuit judge
launched an investigation into Zain's misconduct. 100 At the end of
the investigation, some of the discovered deliberate and systematic
acts of Zain's misconduct included: (1) reporting multiple items had
been tested, when only one single item had been tested; (2)
reporting inconclusive results as conclusive; (3) repeatedly altering
laboratory records; (4) implying a match with a suspect when
testing supported only a match with the victim; and (5) reporting
scientifically impossible or improbable results. 101
Other instances of forensic experts lying about evidence include a
lab analyst named Pamela Fish who testified that serology testing
was inconclusive when, in fact, it excluded John Willis, who spent
95 Id. at 615. However, despite some questionable forensic work, the prevailing wisdom in
San Bernadino is that Cooper was guilty and we did not believe that any great weight would
be given to challenges to the work Gregonis performed in the Cooper case. Id. at 615-16.
96 Robert Suro, Ripples of a Pathologist's Misconduct in Graves and Courts of West Texas,
N.Y. TIMES Nov. 22, 1992, at A22.
97 Richard Perez-Pena, Supervision of Troopers Faulted in Evidence-Tampering Scandal,
N.Y. TIMES Feb. 4, 1997, at B1.
98 In re Investigation of the W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., Serology Div., 438 S.E.2d 501
(W. Va. 1993).
9 Id. at 509.
100 Id. at 502.
101 Id. at 503.
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eight-and-a-half years behind bars for a crime he did not commit. 102
In another example, a Santa Clara prosecutor named Jaime
Stringfield used a phony lab report in a sexual assault case which
indicated the presence of the suspect's semen on the victim's
bedspread when no such semen existed. 0 3 In another case, a police
chemist named Joyce Gilchrist testified that hairs and DNA proved
Curtis McCarty, who spent twenty-one years behind bars for a
crime he did not commit, was in fact at the crime scene when
testing on the hair and DNA excluded him. 104 An FBI Special Agent
named Thomas Curran testified against Thomas Doepel in a rape
and murder trial claiming that Doepel's shorts contained the
victim's blood when, in fact, they did not.105 In another case, a
college anthropology professor named Louise Robbins testified
falsely for over a decade in more than twenty criminal cases that
she could match a footprint on any surface to the person who made
it, putting more than a dozen people behind bars before her claims
were thoroughly debunked. i06
XI. A VICTORY?
Immediately after hearing closing arguments, Judge McCarville
granted the petition. As expected, he did not find that Gregonis had
planted evidence. However, he did conclude that the conviction had
been based on false evidence and that our new evidence undermined
the prosecution's case.
Unfortunately, our victory was short lived. Judge McCarville
stayed the granting of the writ in order to give the prosecution an
opportunity to appeal. As this is being written, the prosecution has
appealed and it looks like another year will pass before we have the
possibility of a final resolution of the case.
Technically, Richards is eligible for release on bail pending
appeal. But the bail has been set at a level that makes his release
impossible. So William Richards, who we believe to be innocent,
and whose conviction has been thoroughly undermined, continues to
102 Steve Mills, et al., When Labs Falter, Defendants Pay: Bias Toward Prosecution Cited in
Illinois Cases, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Oct. 20, 2004, at C1.
103 Tracey Kaplan, Did Santa Clara County Prosecutor Withhold Evidence in Sex-Assault
Case? MERCURY NEWS, June 14, 2009.
104 The Innocence Project, After 21 Years in Prison-Including 16 on Death Row-Curtis
McCarty is Exonerated Based on DNA Evidence,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/575.php (last visited Mar. 30, 2010).
105 JOHN F. KELLY & PHILLIP K. WEARNE, TAINTING EVIDENCE: INSIDE THE SCANDALS AT
THE FBI CRIME LAB 14 (1998).
106 Id. at 13.
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languish behind bars for a crime he did not commit.
